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COMMENTS
IN QUEST OF A "DECENT SOCIETY":
OBSCENITY AND THE BURGER COURT
There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the stern 19th cen-
tury American censorship of public distribution and display of mate-
rial relating to sex ... in any way limited or affected expression of se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific ideas.
-- Chief Justice Warren Burger'
For sixteen years following its seminal decision in Roth v. United
States,2 the United States Supreme Court was unable to produce an-
other majority opinion on the issue of obscenity. In the final week of
last Term, however, eight months after hearing arguments, the Chief
Justice announced five to four majority opinions in a series of five deci-
sions.3 These opinions have stimulated widespread comment in the press
and aroused fears (and hopes) of a governmental drive against obscenity. 4
Whatever their psychological effect on citizens and prosecutors, the
legal effect of these decisions has been to modify the prior
1. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2621 (1973).
2. 354 U.S. 476(1957).
3. Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973); United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct.
2674 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665
(1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973); Miller v. California,
93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). Miller, Orito and 12 Reels had been originally argued in Jan-
uary, 1972. They were docketed for reargument in June, and reargued in November,
1972. Paris Theatre was argued in October, 1972. The decisions were announced on
June 21, 1973. The time taken to announce a decision, together with the narrow five to
four vote, suggests that the ultimate decision was uncertain for a portion of the interven-
ing period. This conjecture is reinforced by the curious language of Justice Brennan's
dissent, which often seemed to be announcing his views as the majority holding. It
seems quite possible that one of the five-man majority defected from his adherence to
Justice Brennan's opinion after that opinion was actually written. See Lewin, Sex at
High Noon in Times Square, THE NEw REPUBLIC, July 7 & 14, 1973, at 19.
4. [The] Chairman of the [Seattle] Public Safety Committee indicated that
there may be even tighter enforcement.
"The Supreme Court has taken a proper and long overdue step," he declared.
"I feel sure my committee will begin to take a look at those places that have been
the outlet for hard core pornography in Seattle.
"I believe the people of our city want reasonable standards that will keep us out
of the gutter."
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 22, 1973, at A5, col. 1.
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Roth-Memoirs test,5 retaining-and perhaps aggravating-the con-
ceptual difficulties inherent in the two-level speech construct.1 In these
opinions the Court examined for the first time the legitimate purposes
which a state rationally might implement in controlling non-protected
obscene speech. Furthermore, as dicta two years earlier had seemed to
prophesy, the Court refused to recognize a right of privacy to re-
ceive or transport obscene material for personal use, effectively lim-
iting Stanley v. Georgia7 to its facts. Despite these setbacks for sup-
porters of free speech, however, the Court's language and identifica-
tion of issues parallels the approach suggested by Dr. Meiklejohn's
model of the first amendment.8
It is the thesis of this Comment that the Burger Court, in its search
for constitutional certainty and structure, and for neutral principles of
constitutional adjudication, has seized upon the Meiklejohn model
and applied it to the area of obscenity. It has done so gropingly and in
an effort to restrict, not to expand, openness of expression; neverthe-
less, as a repository of constructive constitutional theory, Miller and its
companion cases may prove more beneficial to future first amendment
adjudication than all the confusing obscenity decisions of the Warren
years.
I. THE NEW DECISIONS: NAILING DOWN OBSCENITY
Of the five opinions, the two most important in their contribution
to the theory of obscenity law are Miller v. California!' and Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.10 Miller supplies the analytical contours of
a redefined two-level theory of speech, offering an explanation of why
obscene expression is not protected by the first amendment; Paris
Theatre, in applying a due process rational basis test, describes the
goals which state or federal government might assert to justify sup-
pression of obscenity, overcoming barriers presented by the due
5. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957); A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts
(Memoirs), 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). For an explanation of the Roth-Memnoirs test.
see note 83 and accompanying text infra.
6. The term was coined by Professor Kalven. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law
of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 10.
7. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
8. See text accompanying notes 163-184 infra.
9. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
10. 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
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process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. All five opinions
lacked the usual attributes of judicial decisions. The facts were out-
lined sketchily in each case, with little description of the contested,
allegedly obscene material. In Miller and Paris Theatre in particular
the facts, once stated, received no further discussion or analysis; the
cases served simply as vehicles by which the Court launched its trea-
tises on obscenity. Having announced new doctrines, the Court de-
clined to apply them to the facts of each case. It vacated the lower
court decisions in all five cases, as well as in all obscenity cases
pending on the docket, 1 instructing the lower courts to reconsider
their decisions in light of the Court's new guidelines. As 'a conse-
quence, any analysis of obscenity law in the United States at this time
is necessarily abstract in nature, and must rely on principles not yet
tempered by application to concrete facts.
The Court used each case to spotlight a different facet of its re-
stated approach to obscenity. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Miller
strongly emphasized that the Court's last previous majority opinion
had been in Roth. It expressly repudiated portions of Justice Bren-
nan's three-member plurality opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts12
and impliedly called into question the validity of every other obscenity
opinion handed down since Roth. Although it is "categorically settled"13
that the first amendment does not protect obscene material, the
Chief Justice took note of the "inherent dangers" involved in regu-
lating expression, and acknowledged that state and federal govern-
ments must use care when controlling obscenity. Hence, he announced
that the Court would permit only regulation which observed newly
promulgated guidelines: 14
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the av-
erage person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest....
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,
11. The Court discussed procedural issues in three additional cases, remanding
all three for further proceedings in light of its new guidelines. Heller v. New York, 93
S. Ct. 2789 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 2796 (1973); Alexander v.. Vir-
ginia, 93 S. Ct. 2803 (1973). Fifty-nine additional obscenity cases on the Court's
docket were remanded by summary order. See 93 S. Ct. 3026-67 (1973).
12. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
13. Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2614.
14. Id. at 2615.
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and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value.
The Court left to the states and to Congress the definition of the de-
scriptions of sexual conduct to be proscribed, but the Chief Justice
offered examples of the type of content he had in mind:15
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
The Court emphasized that its new standards were intended to permit
prosecution only for the sale or exposure of depictions or descriptions
of "patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined
by the regulating state law, as written or construed,"' 6 and asserted
that this definition was sufficiently precise to overcome the vagueness
objections raised by Justice Brennan in dissent.
The Miller Court also clarified to a degree the definition of "com-
munity standards." In judging the prurient appeal or offensiveness of
sexually-oriented material, the judge or jury is not required to apply
some hypothetical national standard,17 but may draw on the standards
of the local community. The first amendment does not require "the
people of Maine or Mississippi [to] accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City."' 8 The Court did not
specify how localized the community used as reference might be-a
county? a village?-but Miller approved the lower court's use of
the standards of the state of California. 19
The Paris Theatre decision rejected the contention that a state may
not prevent consenting adults from receiving or viewing obscenity.
The Court stressed that protection of juveniles and non-consenting
adults were not the only interests which a state might legitimately as-
sert to justify regulation of obscenity; of paramount importance, said
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2616.
17. Accord, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
18. 93 S. Ct. at 2619.
19. One month after the Miller decision, the Washington Supreme Court declared
that "community standards" in Washington are the standards of the state as a whole.
State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 584, 610, 512 P.2d 1049, 1065 (1973). See
Brazelton v. State, 282 So.2d 342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973) (standards are those of
county in which offense occurred and from which jury is drawn).
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the Court, quoting former Chief Justice Warren, was the " 'right of
the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society . . . .. "0
Since obscenity is not afforded first amendment protection, the state
need have only a rational basis for concluding that regulation will
contribute to a healthier society, and, the majority continued:2'
The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords
an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key rela-
tionship of human existence, central to family life, community wel-
fare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and
distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex.
Analogizing obscenity regulation to environmental and consumer pro-
tection legislation, the Court rejected deference to individual free will;
the Constitution does not compel the states to accept a laissez faire
policy in social or economic spheres when the state instead desires "to
protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible
from the exercise of their own volition. '22
The Paris Theatre Court dismissed the argument that the individu-
al's right to privacy required the state to demonstrate a compelling
interest to justify prohibiting the reading or viewing of obscene mate-
rial by consenting adults. It declared that the right enunciated in
Stanley v. Georgia23 of a person to read anything in his own home
was "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his
castle,' ",24 and does not imply derivative rights outside the home. The
Cotdrt also decided that the state need not elicit expert testimony as to
the obscene nature of material, at least when the material is directed
to non-deviant groups,25 since obscene materials "obviously, are the
best evidence of what they represent. '2 6
United States v. Orito27 and United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Super 8 mm. Film28 further emphasized the limited extent of the pri-
vacy right recognized by Stanley. In Orito, the Court held that Con-
20. 93 S. Ct. at 2636, quoting Jacobeflis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (War-
ren, C. J., dissenting).
21. 93 S. Ct. at 2638.
22. Id. at 2638-39.
23. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
24. 93 S. Ct. at 2640.
25. Id. at 263.4 n.6.
26. Id. at 2634.
27. 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973).
28. 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973).
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gress had ample power under the commerce clause to prohibit inter-
state transportation of obscene matter. The defendant had challenged
the statute under which he was charged 29 as overbroad since it failed
to distinguish public from private transportation. The Court, analog-
izing to laws which forbid interstate transportation, both public and
private, of lottery tickets and of women for immoral purposes, de-
clared that Congress could legislate to prevent use of interstate com-
merce in the spreading of moral evils; the Court also observed that
Congress may reasonably have determined that even privately trans-
ported obscene matter intended for private use was more apt to be
exposed to juveniles and unwilling audiences than would material
kept in the home. In 12 Reels, the Court reversed a lower court deter-
mination that a statute forbidding importation of "obscene or immo-
ral" material was unconstitutional on its face.30 The Chief Justice's
opinion declared that the power of Congress to regulate imports was
"plenary,"' 1 and governed by rules different from those applying to
domestic transportation. Since Stanley's protection of private posses-
sion in the home afforded no correlative right to receive obscene ma-
terial, Congress's power to regulate was unlimited.3 2 Finally, in Kaplan v.
California,3 3 the Court rejected the argument that a book without pic-
tures could not be obscene: 34
Obscenity can, of course, manifest itself in conduct, in the pictoral
representation of conduct, or in the written and oral description of
conduct. The Court has applied similarly conceived First Amendment
standards to moving pictures, to photographs, and to words in books.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
31. 93 S. Ct. at 2667.
32. The Court seemed to suggest that the first amendment imposes no limitation
on Congress's power to regulate imports. The statute in question provided that "the
Secretary of the Treasury may, in his discretion, admit the so-called classics or books
of recognized and established literary or scientific merit . . . only when imported for
noncommercial purposes." 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970) (emphasis added). The Court
observed that it had upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting importation
of any films of prize fights usable for public exhibition. Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S.
325 (1915), cited 93 S. Ct. at 2667-68. But see United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971): "[O]bscenity is not within the scope of
First Amendment protection. Hence Congress may declare it contraband and prohibit
its importation .... ." The negative implication is that Congress may not prohibit
importation of protected speech materials, contrary to the Court's suggestion in Miller.
33. 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
34. Id. at 2684.
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Justice Douglas dissented in all cases, expressing his long-held be-
lief that the first amendment contains no implied exception for regula-
tion of obscenity. Obscenity, he stated, is simply a matter of taste and
private morality, not of constitutional law. The only exception which
Justice Douglas would recognize to his policy of'judicial "abstention" 35
involves the case in which obscene matter is forced upon captive
audiences. 36
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, also dis-
sented, rejecting not only the majority's new formulation of obscenity
doctrine, but also his own test announced seven years earlier in
Memoirs.37 Justice Brennan conceded that the concept of unprotected
obscenity might exist "in the sky," so to speak,38 but denied that it
could be defined in a way sufficiently precise to give fair notice to
those charged under a criminal statute and to avoid "chilling" the
expression of protected speech. Because an attempt to suppress ob-
scenity necessarily works a chilling effect on protected erotic expres-
sion, Justice Brennan wrote, it c6uld be justified only by the state's
demonstration that it was required to accomplish a compelling in-
terest.39 While a state traditionally has been granted an interest under
the police power to protect public morality, this interest is too "unfo-
cused and ill-defined" 40 to justify any chilling of first amendment free-
doms. Justice Brennan would have preferred to await a more appro-
priate case before determining whether protection of juveniles and
unwilling audiences would serve as sufficiently compelling interests for
this purpose.41
35. Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2664.
36. Cf. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
37. See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
38. Borrowed from Justice Holmes and applied to obscenity in Comment, More
Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE LJ. 1364, 1403 (1966).
39. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) required a compelling
state interest to support regulation of conduct (draft card burning) when that regu-
lation inhibited the expression of political ideas.
40. Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2660 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. The practical difference between the recommendations of Justices Brennan
and Douglas, disregarding the difference in analytical approaches, would be in the in-
terests which a state could assert to justify obscenity regulation. Justice Brennan would
probably allow protection of juveniles and nonconsenting audiences as sufficient
interests to justify regulation. Justice Douglas would permit protection only of "captive
audiences," following the much more stringent standards established for regulation
of offensive but protected speech. See note 155 infra.
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II. OBSCENITY REGULATION: ORIGINS
AND RATIONALES
Obscenity has been around since our ancestors learned to mark up
the walls of their cave with a charred stick.42 It was pleasing to the
gods in Ancient Greece 43 and to mortals in Ancient Rome; 44 both civi-
lizations have since expired. It was displeasing to His Majesty's courts
in England, however; punishment for obscenity in Anglo-American
jurisprudence is said to have originated in 1663 when Sir Charles
Sedley harangued an Oxford mob while standing naked on his bal-
cony.45 In the United States, the first recorded obscenity conviction
was in 1821 for the sale of Fanny Hill.46 Later American decisions
followed the authoritative test delivered in 1868 by the Queen's Bench
in Regina v. Hicklin:47
I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall.
The Hicklin "tendency . . . to deprave . . . those . . . open to such
immoral influences ..... test, often said to be the predecessor of the
Roth test, was simply a criminal definition, however. The Queen's
Bench did not purport to establish a constitutional touchstone for the
United States; it merely observed that "the law of England does not
allow of any obscene publication .... ,,48 Nevertheless American
courts looked to Hicklin in interpreting obscenity statutes49 and only
gradually modified the test to avoid some of its more unacceptable
results. 50 These decisions did not attempt to explain any inconsistency
42. See H. KATCHADOURIAN & D. LUNDE, FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY
283 fig. 11.2 (1972) (cave petroglyph portraying an act of zoophilia).
43. Dramatic comedy had its origins in obscene phallic celebrations held in honor
of Dionysos. See generally G. NORWOOD, GREEK COMEDY 1-13 (1963).
44. Pompeii is famed for its obscene murals.
45. Le Roy v. Sir Charles Sedley, I Sid. 168, pl. 29 (K.B. 1663); see generally
Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1938).
46. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821).
47. [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (Opinion of Cockburn, CJ.). See, e.g., Miller,
93 S. Ct. at 2620.
48. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1879).
50. See, e.g., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d
Cir. 1934) ("the effect of the book as a whole is the test")
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between obscenity regulation and the first amendment; at most, courts
tried to balance the community interests involved, seeking, in the
words of Judge Learned Hand, "a passable compromise between op-
posing interests, whose relative importance, like that of all social or
personal values, is incommensurable. '51
Following these early cases, decisions in obscenity cases remained
primarily a matter of determining the legislati~ve intent in proscribing
"obscenity"52 only because the courts were so slow to recognize the
implications of the first amendment.53 Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion in Roth was the first to attempt a conciliation between obscenity
regulation and freedom of speech. However, rather than fashion ob-
scenity doctrine within a first amendment framework, perhaps by
adopting a balancing test such as that advanced by Judge Hand, the
Court resolved the problem by negating it. It did so by resort to what
Professor Kalven has described as a two-level theory of speech, a
theory positing the existence of some extra-first amendment categories
of speech the "punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. '54 One such category is speech which
inflicts injury or incites immediate breach of the peace 55 Another
category-or perhaps a subcategory of the first-is libel. The Court
had observed in Beauharnais v. Illinois56 that libel was punishable at
common law, and that no suggestion was made at or after the time of
the adoption of the Constitution that libel was to be protected by the
first amendment. In Roth, Justice Brennan added obscenity to the cat-
egory of non-protected speech.5 7 Roth has been voluminously, and
51. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936). Judge Hand con-
tinued:
There can never be constitutive principles for such judgments .... [0] bscen-
ity" is a function of many variables, and the verdict of the jury is not the conclu- "
sion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor premiss [sic], but
really a small bit of legislation ad hoe, like the standard of care.
Id.
52. Judge Hand attempted to give substance to the obscenity subsection of Of-
fenses Against the Postal Service, 35 Stat. 1088, 1129 (1909): "Every obscene, lewd,
or lascivious, and every filthy book . . . or other publication of an indecent charac-
ter .. " Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-65 (1970).
53. The constitutional history of the first amendment did not really begin until
America experienced a mass influx of "foreign" ideas during World War I; see
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
54. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
55. Id.
56. 343 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1952).
57. Chaplinsky had referred only to obscenity which results in injury or breach
of peace. 315 U.S. at 572.
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often ably,58 discussed, but the Court's decisions last Term so empha-
sized Roth's stature that a brief reexamination of its analytical ap-
proach is justified.
The Roth Court assumed the existence of a definable species of
speech called "obscenity": "The dispositive question is whether ob-
scenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and press."5 9
By interweaving historical and utilitarian arguments, the Court an-
swered this question in the negative. After a cursory discussion of col-
onial law, Justice Brennan concluded that the framers of the first
amendment intended that obscenity, like libel, was to be outside the
realm of protected speech. The framers intended to promote
self-government, as well as to advance truth, science, morality and the
arts, but "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejec-
tion of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.130
The term "redeeming social value" entered our legal jargon, then, not
as part of a definition of obscenity but as an explanation of history's
refusal to accord it protection. The Court buttressed this historical
argument with some utilitarian reasoning: All ideas, however hateful,
are protected by the first amendment, but it is the consensus of con-
temporary civilization that obscene utterances "are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas. '61
Having justified exclusion of obscenity from first amendment pro-
tection, Justice Brennan proceeded to define "obscenity." Following
the lead of Judge Hand, he might have deferred to the good sense and
representative nature of the jury, permitting it to weigh the conflicting
interests in each case and to define obscenity by "legislation ad hoc." ' 32
Instead, apparently interpreting the intent of those who wrote the first
amendment, he declared that "[o] bscene material is material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."'' 3 But ap-
58. See, e.g., Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
REV. 1; Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966).
59. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 (footnote omitted).
60. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
61. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568.
572 (1942).
62. See note 51 supra.
63. 354 U.S. at 487 (footnotes omitted). The Court gave two definitions of
"prurient" and said it perceived no significant difference between them. Id. at 487 n.20.
The Court's own definition was "a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." The Model Pe-
nal Code's definition was considerably more restrictive: "a shameful or morbid in-
terest in nudity, sex, or excretion. ... MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957).
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pealing to the prurient interest of whom? The Hicklin test had led
courts to ascertain the effect of material on the most susceptible
person likely to come into contact with it. But-and here the first
amendment finally had a substantial impact on the Court's reasoning,
making Roth a constitutional rather than simply a criminal case-
continued use of this standard would result in an intolerable burden
on protected expression of sexual ideas. Therefore, the Court held, to
avoid restriction of protected speech, material containing obscene
(i.e., prurient) portions could be proscribed only if "to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. '64
Roth evoked considerable critical commentary, 65 most notably
from Professor Kalven, whose brilliant criticism of the Roth reasoning
may well have directly resulted in Justice Brennan's reformulation of
his definition of obscenity in Memoirs.66 Kalven focused on Roth's use
of a utilitarian justification for obscenity regulation, criticizing those
portions of the opinion which relied on an historical approach. The
appeal to history, if it became fully accepted, could lead to further
exemptions from first amendment protection which seemed unpalat-
able in today's world-blasphemy, for example, and seditious libel,
both of which were criminal offenses at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted. Instead, he insisted, the crux of Roth's reasoning was that
"' [a] 11 ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance'...
are protected against governmental restraint. ' 67 Roth thus allowed
government to proscribe obscenity because obscenity has no re-
deeming social value.
But, Kalven asked, what is obscenity? "A legal term gets its
meaning from the construction put on it by the courts,"68 and distin-
64. 354 U.S. at 489 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
65. Dean Lockhart and Professor McClure viewed Roth from a different per-
spective. They proposed that the Court had only one target in Roth: the Hicklin test.
Roth established but two constitutional requirements: that material be judged as a
whole and that it be judged by its impact on the average, not the most susceptible,
person. The rest of the Roth formula embraced all the contemporary definitions of
obscenity, they suggested, and all might well be acceptable constitutionally. Lockhart
& McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 49-58 (1960). Dean Lockhart served as Chairman of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, 1968-70.
66. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id.at 13.
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guished courts had classified books like Lady Chatterley's Lover as
obscene. 69 Thus, under the Roth presumption, these books would be
in the category of speech which has no redeeming social value.70 To
avoid arriving at this absurd conclusion, the Court in subsequent cases
would find it necessary, he predicted, to predicate a determination of
obscenity on a finding that the matter contained no redeeming social
value; it could not, if Roth were to make sense, presume a lack of
value from a finding of obscenity. This rather dazzling syllogism may
have precipitated Justice Brennan's Memoirs reformulation of the
Roth test.
Professor Kalven's syllogism was based on one possible reading of
Roth; by incorporating the "no redeeming social value" requirement
into his Memoirs definition, Justice Brennan implicitly approved Kal-
ven's interpretation. Justice Brennan is of course, the most authorita-
tive arbiter of his own writing; still, an alternative construction of his
ambiguous Roth opinion would have preserved it from the logical
infirmities which Kalven perceived and, by eliminating Kalven's per-
ceived reductio ad absurdum, would have obviated the necessity of
the later Memoirs clarification. 71
Roth's ambiguity has its source in the heart of the opinion's anal-
ysis: its use of the word "obscentity." Justice Brennan's analysis began
with a definition: obscenity is "material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest. 7 2 It concluded with a second
definition: obscenity may be suppressed if "to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. ' 73 Kalven's
analysis equates the two definitions, viewing the second as a refined
version of the first. This equation results in a basic flaw in his argu-
ment: The first definition describes material arguably possessing no
social importance, but the second encompasses minor themes which
almost always will contain some value.
69. See Commonwealth v. DeLacey, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930).
70. Justice Harlan raised very similar objections in his dissent. 354 U.S. at 497-98.
7 1. To suggest that a Supreme Court justice is moved more by logical imperatives
than by policy objectives may be tantamount to a confession of gross naivete. Cer-
tainly, however, judges prefer to hang their policy decisions on pegs of logic; Kalven's
syllogism presented Justice Brennan a well-crafted peg.
72. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (footnotes omitted).
73. 354U.S.at489.
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The suggested alternative construction would argue that Roth in
fact defined two concepts: The first definition could be called "ob-
scenity-in-fact," the second, "constitutional obscenity." Obscenity-
in-fact, being material whose effect is the arousing of prurient inter-
est, might rationally have been rejected as without social importance.
Few books or films, however, consist of an unrelieved sequence of
prurient representations, thus qualifying as- pure obscenity-in-fact.
Indeed, many pre-Roth obscenity decisions reflected an awareness
that some literary or artistic value was being sacrificed for the sake of
eliminating pornographic passages.74 Roth's definition of constitu-
tional obscenity preserved this balancing approach; it recognized that
suppression of constitutional obscenity may entail some suppression of
socially important material, but in a balancing of societal interests a
state could conclude75 that protection of these minor themes is out-
weighed in importance by the state's interest in suppressing the ob-
scene-in-fact dominant theme.76
Important literary works like Lady Chatterley's Lover, found ob-
scene in pre-Roth cases, would be protected after Roth since their
dominant theme was not obscene-in-fact; under this. interpretation,
Professor Kalven's parade of horribles thus would have been halted
before it got under way. But Roth would not have required that con-
stitutional obscenity be utterly without redeeming value, and insofar
as Justice Brennan's eventual interpretation of Roth and addition of
an explicit requirement that material be found to be without re-
deeming social value was influenced by Kalven's writings, the pro-
fessor contributed to a tightening of the obscenity test.77
In Roth, Justice Brennan had observed in a footnote that the Court
74. See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); Commonwealth
v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945); State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079,
272 S.W.2d 283 (1954); People v. Friede, 133 Misc. 611, 233 N.Y.S. 565 (Magis. Ct.
1929).
75. Or, as an alternate interpretation, the Roth Court itself drew the conclusion.
76. The viability of Roth's application of a balancing test under this interpre-
tation is questionable today. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), re-
quired demonstration of a compelling state interest to justify incidental abridgment
of protected expression. Roth, on the other hand, required only a rational basis for the
decision of the state or federal government to choose suppression of a dominant ob-
scene theme over protection of non-obscene minor themes. See Teamsters Union v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 475 (1950), cited in Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 n. 14.
77. Justice Brennan may have had more compelling constitutional reasons for his
addition of a redeeming social value requirement. See text accompanying note 179
infra.
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perceived no significant difference between obscenity as defined at
common law and in the Model Penal Code: "A thing is obscene if,
considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest...
and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in de-
scription or representation of such matters .... -78 An opinion by J us-
tice Harlan in Manual Enterprises v. Day79 explicitly stated that to be
found obscene material must meet the common law definition: It must
be found both pruriently appealing and violative of customary stan-
dards.80
In Jacobellis v. Ohio,81 decided in 1964, Justice Brennan loosely
brought together the various threads of obscenity law which had been
spun out since Roth, threads later to be tied neatly together in Mem-
oirs. He reiterated Roth's prurient appeal requirement; he added Jus-
tice Harlan's patent appeal requirement from Manual Enterprises,
stating that it had been inherent in the Roth decision; he declared that
material advocating ideas or otherwise having value could not be
branded as obscenity, his reasoning paralleling that of Professor
Kalven. He stated that the community standards referred to in the
Roth test contemplated use of a national "community;" otherwise,
"the constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary
with state lines." 82
Jacobellis revealed the deep split within the Court on the obscenity
issue. Justice White concurred only in the judgment. Justices Black
and Douglas would not have permitted exclusion of obscenity from
the general standards of first amendment protection. Justice Stewart
decided that Roth and subsequent cases allowed prohibition only of
hard-core pornography which he declined to define but would know
78. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20 (emphasis added).
79. 370 U.S. 478(1962).
80. At common law, material was obscene if "offensive according to current stan-
dards of decency" (Regina v. Close, [1948] Vict. L.R. 445, 463, quoted in Manual
Enterprises, supra, 370 U.S. at 485. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (Prop. Offi-
cial Draft, 1962)). but only obscenity which tended to deprave the beholder was crim-
inally punishable. Both the obscenity statute and the Constitution incorporated the
common law definition, Justice Harlan wrote, and so each required a finding of both
prurient appeal and patent offensiveness. He equated Hicklin's "tendency to deprave"
with Roth's "appeal to prurient interest." Each measured an effect on the recipient.
the one moral, the other physical or psychological.
81. 378 U.S. 184(1964).
82. 378 U.S. at 194-95. quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331. 335 (1946).
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when he saw. In dissent, Chief Justice Warren joined by Justice
Clark was willing to live with the Roth test. However, he believed that
"community standards" meant local, not national, standards, and that
despite the normal doctrine of constitutional facts, trial courts were
the proper forums in which to ascertain those facts relating to ob-
scenity. Justice Harlan agreed with Justice Brennan that the Court
must make an independent judgment on constitutional facts, but be-
lieved that the fourteenth amendment held the states to a lesser stan-
dard than the first amendment held the federal government.
Two years after Jacobellis, Justice Brennan collected the thoughts
he had expressed in that decision and welded them into a single tripar-
tite test in Memoirs. Joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice For-
tas, he described the new test as simply an elaboration of the basic
Roth definition of obscenity, implying that the three requirements had
all been inherent in Roth:8 3
We defined obscenity in Roth in the following terms: "[W] hether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." . . . Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases,
three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient in-
terest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.
The lower court in Memoirs had found Fanny Hill to be obscene,
declaring that because a book "has some literary value does not mean
it is of any social importance. [It need not] be unqualifiedly worthless
before it can be deemed obscene."8 4 Justice Brennan categorically
disagreed: "A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be ut-
terly without redeeming social value."8 5 This requirement must be
satisfied independently of the other two, he added. Although, as Chief
Justice Burger emphasized in Miller, the Memoirs requirements were
endorsed by only three members of the Court, since Justices Douglas
83. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
84. 383 U.S. at 419 quoting 349 Mass. at 73, 206 N.E.2d at 406.
85. 383 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added).
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and Black would have reversed all obscenity convictions, 86 Memoirs
was generally treated as the authoritative test by lower courts. 87
Until last Term's holdings, Memoirs was the last decision to discuss
obscenity from a definitional perspective. Against this major tide de-
fining the contours of a body of unprotected expression, which found
expression in cases from Roth to Memoirs, a counter-current flowed
suggesting that less attention be devoted to the characteristics of the
printed material and more to the nature of its dissemination-seeking
in a sense a functional rather than a metaphysical definition. 88 Chief
Justice Warren, concurring in Roth had observed: "It is not the book
that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of the defendant is the cen-
tral issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture. '8 : A number of cases
gave expression to the spirit of this approach, although preserving the
outward forms of the metaphysical definition, by "adjusting" the
Memoirs test to bring within the reach of obscenity laws certain forms
of reprehensible conduct by the seller 90 and by assessing realistically
the effect of erotic materials on the special susceptibilities of certain
groups of buyers.!: Although these decisions had extended Memoirs to
enlarge the permissible scope of obscenity prosecutions when certain
state interests were perceived to be threatened, mention of these inter-
ests in Redrup v. New York) 2 persuaded some commentators that the
86. Justice Douglas observed in Miller that he would have permitted only convic-
tions which complied with his fundamental first amendment rule that the government
can punish speech when brigaded with illegal conduct, see note 176 infra, or when it is
imposed on captive audiences. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Cinecom Theatres Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473
F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1973); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1966). But see Hearn v. Short.
327 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (three judge court declined to follow Memoirs as
not a majority opinion).
88. See generally Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 77-88 (1960).
89. Roth, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
90. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) ("pandering").
91. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (sexual deviants); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (juveniles). The state has long been conceded a special in-
terest in protection of children. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The
state may not assert this special concern for juveniles as a justification for arbitrarily
denying them access to motion pictures, however, since an Adults Only restriction could
render a movie profitless and thus chill expression to adults as well as minors, Interstate
Circuit v. Dallas, 300 U.S. 676 (1968). Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380(1957). See
generally Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Ob-
scenity Litigation, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 179-80.
92. 386 U.S. 767(1967) (per curiam).
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Court had swung away from the metaphysical obscenity approach of
Roth and Memoirs toward a functional obscenity concept empha-
sizing protection of certain traditional state interests.: 3 This approach
seemed to reach its zenith in Stanley v. Georgia,9 4 which was decided
in the midst of a period of confusion following Redrup95
After Redrup, little more was clear than that a species of expression
called "obscenity" did exist which, when identified, was not entitled to
first amendment protection. In Stanley, howeer, the Court indicated
that even when the government established that material was meta-
physically obscene, it might still be unable constitutionally to punish
its possession. The Stanley Court reversed the conviction of a de-
fendant charged with possessing obscene matter in his own house,
holding that the government could assert no justification for "telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch. ' 96 Justice Marshall denied that his decision un-
dermined Roth, but some courts and commentators thought other-
wise, deducing that Stanley's asserted right of "privacy" extended to
all private possession and enjoyment of obscene material and, deriva-
tively, to the right to receive such material for private use. After Stan-
ley, many concluded, regulation of obscenity would be permitted only
when the state could demonstrate a compelling interest in infringing
on the individual's privacy interest; protection of juveniles or of un-
willing audiences were the interests approved in Stanley.97 Stanley
seemed to presage a new trend in obscenity law, an approach which
would balance the real competing interests involved. The embryo mis-
93. Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from Obscenity: Redrup v. New York, 21 HAST-
INGS LJ. 175, 189 (1969). See State v. Rabe, 79 Wn. 2d 254, 484 P.2d 917 (1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); State v. Boyd, 35 Ohio App. 2d 147, 300
N.E.2d 752 (1972).
94. 394U.S. 557, 567 (1969).
95. The Redrup Court had enumerated the respective approaches which members of
the Court would apply to alleged obscenity and had concluded: "Whichever of these
constitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear that the
[convictidn] cannot stand." 386 U.S. at 771. The Court subsequently reversed 31 convic-
tions by per curiam decisions, citing Redrup to indicate that at least "five members of
the Court, applying their separate tests" had found the material protected by the first
amendment. Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2614 n.3. (For a listing of the 31 cases, see Paris Thea-
tre, 93 S. Ct. at 2647 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).) While this approach did justice to
those parties fortunate enough to obtain Supreme Court review, it hardly provided guid-
ance to lower courts.
96. Stanley, 384 U.S. at 565.
97. See, e.g., Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (D.Mass. 1969), vacated
on other grounds, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
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carried, however. Two Nixon appointees ended the "permissive" era,
and dicta in the next obscenity cases appeared to limit Stanley strictly
to protecting the privacy of the home.98 Last Term's decisions con-
verted that dicta into holdings.
III. NEW STANDARDS: PLUS A CHANGE, PLUS C'EST LA
MEME CHOSE?
Hicklin had stated the common law test for obscenity to be whether
the material would deprave and corrupt the most susceptible of those
persons into whose hands it would be apt to fall. Roth reflected the
growing judicial disillusionment with the "most susceptible" formula;
it required that the material's effect on the "average reader" be ascer-
tained, and the nature of its effect be an appeal to pruriency, not a
more speculative tendency to deprave.!' : Roth also indicated an
awareness of the first amendment interests at stake, requiring the ma-
terial's effect as a whole to be judged, not merely the effect of isolated
passages. Memoirs "codified" Roth and subsequent cases into a tripar-
tite test of obscenity. Commentators who examined the fact patterns
in those cases reversed per curiam after Redrup concluded that the
state could reach only the hardest of the hard core material.100 This
conclusion seemed to moot discussion of the subtler aspects of the
Memoirs test, since hard core obscenity was presumed to be
self-identifying. Stanley, considered in conjunction with Redrup, sug-
98. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Pho-
tographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). Four members of the majority in Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs expressed the belief that "obscene materials may be removed from the channels
of commerce when discovered in the luggage of a returning foreign traveler even though
intended solely for his private use." Id. at 376 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
99. The "tendency to deprave" formula has remained the test for obscenity in Eng-
land. In an interesting parallel to American experience with the no redeeming social value
formula, courts simply made a finding of obscenity, and the tendency to deprave was pre-
sumed. In 1959, however, the Obscene Publications Act incorporated the "tendency to
deprave and corrupt" phrase into the definition of obscenity and "[i ] nstead of a pre-
sumed consequence of obscenity, a tendency to deprave and corrupt became the test of
obscenity and became what had to be proved." Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Whyte, [1972] 3 All E.R. 12, 18 (H.L.) (Opinion of Lord Wilberforce). The case con-
tained an amusing discussion of whether those who buy obscenity are not already de-
praved and corrupt to the point where the material can have no tendency to further de-
prave and corrupt them. The Lords did not buy the argument.
100. See, e.g., Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from Obscenity: Redrup v. New York,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 175 (1969).
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gested that laws should be drawn narrowly to protect the interests of
juveniles and unwilling audiences, with the emphasis placed on ac-
complishment of permissible state objectives rather than on a blanket
proscription of certain kinds of expression.
The Miller Court sharply criticized the Memoirs test, which con-
tained the following elements: 101
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
After criticizing this test, the Court announced a very similar tripartite
test of its own: 102
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the. work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
The first requirement in both Miller and Memoirs essentially restates
the Roth holding. Miller dropped the "dominant theme" terminology
found in both Memoirs and Roth, requiring simply that the material,
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest. Omitting "dominant
theme of the material" seems, on its face, to tighten the pruriency re-
quirement; the dominant theme might appeal to pruriency while the
material as a whole, because of the presence of many non-prurient
minor themes, might not. The omission is probably a matter of seman-
tics rather than substance, however; the Court cited a 1972 decision
which had relied on the original Roth formula. 10 3
Memoir's second requirement was modified significantly in two re-
spects. The patent offensiveness now must inhere in depictions or
descriptions of sexual conduct, not merely in sexual content. This
101. 383 U.S. at418.
102. 93 S. Ct. at 2615.
103. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (per curiam).
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change reinforces the Court's efforts to insure that suppressible porno-
graphy contains no ideas. Furthermore, the conduct must be specifically
defined by state law, an effort to escape the vices of vagueness.10 4
Of the changes instituted in Miller, the Court's substitution of a no
serious "literary, artistic, political or scientific value" test for the third
Memoirs requirement has provoked the most attention in the popular
media. Although this transformation may well have symbolic import-
ance as representing the Court's determination to "get tough with
smut," it seems wise not to attach too much importance to variations
in the wording of these formulas.105 Some commentators had sug-
gested that a release of tension in sexually repressed viewers of porno-
graphy might in itself have social value, aside from any value in the
content of the material; the Court does appear to have plugged that
loophole. Furthermore, the jury now must determine whether the
value is "serious," which gives about as free a scope to the prejudices
of the jurors as can be imagined. On the other hand, a decision
whether the social value of the material was sufficient to be "redeem-
ing" called for a similar weighing under the old test. 10 6
Why the Court bothered to formulate this new "serious value" test
remains a puzzling question. 10 7 If the Chief Justice intended to sweep
aside the Memoirs heresy and reason directly from the authorita-
tive Roth opinion, why did he not accept Roth's fundamental and
conclusionary presumption that material found to be obscene inher-
ently lacks redeeming social value? Such a return to the pure ap-
proach of Roth would have enabled the Court to limit itself to review
of a jury's factual finding that material taken as a whole is prurient
(together perhaps with a finding of patent offensiveness). Instead, after
carefully demonstrating that the no redeeming social value test was an
104. See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
105. Those interested in decisions on pornography include many not normally
attentive to Supreme Court niceties, who burn bonfires of celebration or despair
where candles or even matches would be more appropriate.
Krislov, supra, 1968 SuP. CT. REv. at 162.
106. Commentators often overlooked the fact that the "utterly without redeeming
social value" test also suggested a certain weighing of the seriousness of the value. One
judge suggested that too much emphasis had been placed on "utterly" and not enough on
"redeeming." "An orange floating in an open sewer does not change it into a fruit
salad." Court v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 683, 188 N.W.2d 475, 493 (1971) (Hansen, J., concur-
ring).
107. For this Comment's answer, see text accompanying note 179.
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invention of Memoirs and not required by Roth, the Court paradoxi-
cally modified it with a reworded serious value test.
One possible explanation for inclusion of a serious value require-
ment may lie in the difficulty of the Chief Justice garnering a majority
of the justices to endorse his opinion. 108 Just as the original
Roth-Memoirs test was undoubtedly a product of intra-Court negotia-
tions, 09 so the Chief Justice may have been forced to retain a modi-
fied social value test to preserve his majority. 110 A natural conserva-
tism may have caused the Court's reluctance to drop the requirement
completely; furthermore, the subtleties of a legal logic which presumes
all matter found obscene to be valueless would be lost on an alarmed
public suddenly told that material need not be found valueless before
it can be found obscene.
Whatever practical motives may have impelled the Court to adopt
the serious value requirement, the effect of its adoption will be to
tighten the requirements of Roth. Roth had held that material ap-
pealing to prurient interest was utterly without redeeming social value
when the dominant theme of a book appealed to such interests the
book could be suppressed despite the importance of lesser themes.
Roth was, of course, an improvement over Hicklin, which had al-
lowed isolated passages of obscenity to permit suppression of the en-
tire book. Even so, Roth still permitted, as a matter of constitutional
law, minor themes to be sacrificed when the dominant theme was pru-
rient. Roth never explained the first amendment justification for al-
lowing the presence of a dominant prurient theme to enable suppres-
sion of non-obscene minor themes in a work. Under Miller, on the
other hand, even if the dominant theme appeals to prurient interests,
if the work taken as a whole has serious value, it may not be sup-
pressed.
The immediate reaction to these new guidelines is perhaps a combi-
nation of disappointment and relief--disappointment, because the
doctrinal confusion among members of the Warren Court had fos-
tered a growing belief that the concept of obscenity as a peculiar
108. See note 2 supra.
109. See Krislov, supra, 1968 Sup. CT. RE,. at 160.
110. One of that majority, Justice White, strongly opposed inclusion of the "re-
deeming social value" requirement in the Memoirs test. 383 U.S. at 460-62 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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breed of speech outside the protection of the first amendment was on
its way out; I' relief, because the change in the Memoirs test seems so
slight 1 2 and its probable effects so much less restrictive than had been
feared from the Burger Court. 1 3
IV. AVOIDING THE MORE PROGRESSIVE
ALTERNATIVES
A. The "Brennan Uncertainty Principle"
In its emphasis on a metaphysical definition, its rejection of Stanley,
and its cavalier dismissal of vagueness objections which have been
sounded since Roth, the new Miller test almost seems to turn the clock
back to 1966 and Memoirs-a retrenchment to an approach found
unworkable by its originator, amounting to a confession by the majority
that it had learned nothing from the experiences of the intervening
seven years. In contrast, the opinions of Justice Brennan have dis-
played a continued evolution in his thought as the Court's experience
has offered him new insights into the difficulties implicit in attempts
to regulate obscenity. It may prove especially significant in the pano-
rama of obscenity litigation that the author of both the original Roth
formulation and the Memoirs synthesis has now reevaluated his own
prior efforts at developing a metaphysical definition of obscenity, as
11l. The Court tells us that it had reversed 31 convictions in per curiam opinions,
citing Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), without comment. These reversals
occurred whenever "five members of the Court, applying their separate tests" deter-
mined the material to be protected by the first amendment. Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2614 n.3.
For citations of these cases, see Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2647 n.8 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Language in Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969), had lead to specu-
lation that the Court would no longer judge the nature of the material but the circum-
stances of its sale; thus, it was thought, the Court would permit obscenity to be regulated
only in pursuit of such limited state interests as the protection of children (see Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)), or of unwilling viewers (see Redrup v. New York.
supra; State v. Rabe, 79 Wn. 2d 254. 484 P.2d 917 (1971), rev'd per curiam, 405 U.S.
313 (1972)).
112. [T] he Court's restatement substantially tracks the three-part test announced
in Memoirs v. Massachusetts . . . [and] [w] hether it will be easier to prove that
material lacks "serious" value than to prove that it lacks any value at all remains, of
course, to be seen.
Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2654-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. But see Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
[T] oday's restatement will likely have the effect, whether or not intended, of permit-
ting far more sweeping suppression of sexually oriented expression, including ex-
pression that would almost surely be held protected under our current formulation.
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well as those of the Miller Court, and has found them wanting.
Justice Brennan has formulated what might be called the "Brennan Un-
certainty Principle":114 Because a fine line separates protected speech
from unprotected obscenity, a line which can be determined only by
measuring the value of the expression in question in a given case, any
statutory attempt to avoid due process void-for-vagueness objections by
drawing a clear and easily understood boundary between prohibited
and permitted erotic expression runs afoul of the first amendment by
permitting suppression of some protected sexually-oriented material; 115
conversely, any attempt to sensitively define by statute that fine line
which does protect first amendment interests and at the same time per-
mits all unprotected obscenity to be punished requires use of terms so
vague1 6 that a buyer or seller of sexually-oriented material is unable to
know in advance whether he is committing a criminal act, thus depriv-
ing him of due process rights and, moreover, chilling freedom of speech
for those whose erotic expression would be protected by the first amend-
ment but who fear possible prosecution.117 The dilemma confronting
the legislator is that certainty in the statute creates uncertainty in the
constitutionality of its application, requiring its invalidation for over-
breadth; certainty in constitutionality of the statute's application
creates uncertainty as to prohibited conduct, requiring its invalidation
for vagueness.
114. Cf. the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, a basic postulate of quantum
physics, which states that while either the momentum or the position of a subatomic
particle can be determined with precision at a point in time, both quantities cannot be
so fixed at once. Thus, precise determination of momentum will leave an uncertainty
in position, and vice versa. See A. GLASSNER, INTRODUCTION TONUCLEAR SCIENCE 73 (1961).
115. For example, a state might flatly forbid representations of certain well-defined
forms of sexual conduct. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 167.060 - .100 (1971 Supp.) (see
note 120 infra); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 245.10 and 245.11 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73.).
This approach, if incorporated in a general obscenity statute, rather than in a statute
designed to protect a limited state interest in minors or privacy, would be unconstitu-
tionally overbroad; Miller itself admitted by negative implication that even prurient,
patently offensive representations may have serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value. 93 S. Ct. at 2616.
116. The meaning of" 'prurient,' 'patent offensiveness,' [and] 'serious artistic or lit-
erary value' . . . varies with the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the
person defining them." Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2647 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. This difficulty was foreseen in Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 882-910 (1970), cited in Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at
2650 n.12. The student authors concluded that a rule such as that defining obscenity
"must usually be somewhat overprotective of first amendment interests in order to
avoid underprotecting them." 83 HARv. L. REv. at 890.
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Justice Brennan was unwilling to accept the long-espoused asser-
tion of Justice Douglas that to define obscenity is constitutionally
meaningless because obscenity does not exist as a separate category of
unprotected speech. Obscenity exists all right, he maintained; the
question is whether it can be isolated. Deciding that it cannot be iso-
lated and that attempts to do so will chill protected speech, he con-
cluded that the state cannot attack obscenity without demonstrating a
compelling interest which outweighs the first amendment interests
imperiled by the chill.
His suggested approach has the advantage of impeccable constitu-
tional orthodoxy. He accepted the fundamental postulate of the
two-level speech theory, that obscenity is not constitutionally pro-
tected speech, and used it to trigger the O'Brien balancing test.' 8
O'Brien requires a compelling governmental interest; Stanley v.
Georgia and Redrup v. New York had already suggested that the state
had a special interest in protection of children and unwilling audi-
ences, and Justice Brennan said that he would be willing to examine
the strength of those interests when they were presented in a proper
case. Certainly, he noted, after Stanley no one could claim that the
state had a legitimate, rational interest-not to mention a compelling
interest-in controlling the moral tone of a person's thoughts.
The Chief Justice shrugged off this final objection; since obscenity
conveys no ideas,' : controlling obscenity to protect legitimate state
interests is not forbidden even if some "thoughts" are incidentally af-
fected, he asserted, thereby rather spectacularly missing the crucial
point. Justice Brennan had criticized ends, not means. What were
these "legitimate state interests" if not a direct control on a person's
thoughts? Stanley also had discussed obscenity; it had asserted that
controlling obscenity for the sole purpose of preserving the decency of
people's thoughts was impermissible even though obscenity is unpro-
tected by the first amendment. The Chief Justice also posed the spe-
cious analogy of drug control; the state can prohibit drugs, he ob-
118. "[W] hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course
of conduct," the state may regulate the nonspeech elements even at the expense of lim-
iting first amendment freedoms if it acts in pursuit of a compelling state interest, if this
interest is unrelated to suppression of free expression, and if the regulation is strictly
limited to the extent that it is essential for furtherence of the interest. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
119. But see text accompanying notes 161-205 infra.
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served, even though it thereby deprives the addict of his fantasies.
Again he confused ends and means: Did the government prohibit
drugs for the sole purpose of halting fantasies? Presumably it could
assert more tangible interests to justify controls on heroin.
As for the primary thrust of Justice Brennan's argument, the ma-
jority opinion attempted to avoid arriving at a point where an O'Brien
analysis became necessary, asserting that obscenity was isolatable
from protected speech and that Brennan's Uncertainty Principle was
fallacious. For example, Miller limited the government to regulation
of representations of "sexual conduct specifically defined by applic-
able state law."
The nature of the Miller requirements, however, which demand a
weighing by a jury of competing values, itself seems to vitiate this at-
tempted escape from vagueness. The Chief Justice suggested recent
enactments by legislatures in Oregon and Hawaii as examples of state
laws "directed at depiction of defined physical conduct, as opposed to
expression."12 0 Requiring a finding of serious artistic, literary, scien-
tific or political value unquestionably reintroduces a great element of
uncertainty into the test. The Chief Justice seemed to feel that this
uncertainty is acceptable; he stated that a dealer distributing hard core
material defined by state law will be put on "fair notice" that he may
be prosecuted. Of course, this notice itself provides exactly the chill
on marginal materials which have serious value that Justice Brennan
feared. The Chief Justice observed that marginal cases will arise
under any standard, cases "in which it is difficult to determine the side
of the line on which a particular fact situation falls . ... ,,1 This
argument is valid as applied to a determination that a depiction of
conduct meets the legally required definition of "nudity" or "sexual
120. Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2615 n.6. The Oregon statute, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 167,060-
.100 (1971 Supp.), does achieve a great deal of precision, banning depictions and
descriptions of nudity, sado-masochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement,
each term defined in careful and graphic detail. The statute forbids distribution and
display of the described material in absolute terms and does not require the jury to
make determinations of patent offensiveness or prurient appeal. The statute could be
found constitutional, however, only because limited to distribution to minors and public
display for advertising purposes. Since commercial speech, Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942), and speech directed to juveniles, Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968), are excluded from the usual standards of first amendment protection,
Oregon need not require a finding that material under the statute possesses no serious
value, but clearly, under the rules which Miller set forth, such a finding would be re-
quired in order to permit suppression of sales to adults.
121. Miller, 93 S. Ct at 2617 n.10, quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 491-92.
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conduct;" but can a writer predict whether his story will be found to
have "serious" literary value, at least until he sees the expression on
the jurors' faces? 1 22
The Court introduced even greater potential uncertainty into this
requirement by adding that it did not hold "that all States other
than Oregon must now enact new obscenity statutes. Other existing
state statutes, as construed heretofore or hereafter, may well be ade-
quate."' 23 The Chief Justice added that, while state courts might do as
they would, 124
we are prepared to construe [the terms "obscene," "lewd," "lasci-
vious," "filthy," "indecent," and "immoral"] as limiting regulated
material to patently offensive representations or descriptions of [ulti-
mate sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibi-
tions of genitals].
Surely this was judicial construction with a vengeance!' 25
122. The Washington Court answered this argument by an appeal to authority:
[T] he import of Roth is not a thing of the past.... In Roth the United States Supreme
Court considered carefully whether the word "obscene" is unconstitutionally vague
and found that it was not. Accord, Mishkin v. New York ....
J-R Distributors, 82 Wn. 2d at 600, 512 P.2d at 1060.
Rot/h, however, relied essentially on the common law definition of obscenity. The Court
in Winters v. New York 333 U.S. 507 (1948), in holding a state statute to be void for
vagueness, had distinguished the "permissible uncertainty in statutes caused by de-
scribing crimes by words well understood through long use in the criminal law-ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting .... Id. at 518. Roth narrowed the
"well understood" definition of obscenity only by requiring that the effect of the mate-
rial be determined on the average reader and that the material be taken as a whole.
These were minor readjustments in definition which a dealer could readily understand.
It is submitted that the Miller test, protecting material however prurient which possesses
"1serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value," is not a test well known to the
criminal law. Its application requires a sophistication far beyond that of the average
buyer or seller of books. Like an oath to show respect to the flag, it may be read broadly
or narrowly depending on the whims of a prosecutor or the cultural sensitivity of a jury:
it thus presents no ascertainable standard of conduct. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964). The effect of the kind of statute sanctioned by Miller will be avoidance by
buyer and seller of all depictions of hard core conduct, regardless of "serious value.-
The vagueness of the Miller standard will thus result in a chilling of constitutionally pro-
tected expression:
We believe that those affected by a statute are entitled to be free of the burdens of
defending prosecutions, however expeditious, aimed at hammering out the struc-
ture of the statute piecemeal, with no likelihood of obviating similar uncertainty
for others.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
123. Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2615 n.6.
124. 12 Reels, 93 S. Ct. at 2670 n.7.
125. The states will pick up the cue. "Obscene" has been construed in Washington since
the Miller decision:
Photographs, pictures and drawings which portray in a patently offensive way
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B. The Demise of Stanley: The Court Avoids Substantive
Due Process
The Court evaded Justice Brennan's vagueness objections by
applying a gloss of superficial precision to its new obscenity definition
and ignoring the difficulties which Justice Brennan had shown to be
inherent in such a definition. On the other hand, it met squarely the
suggestion that after Stanley the state could not interfere with the right
of a consenting adult to read or view what he wishes; outside the
home, the Court held, this right is non-existent. In so holding, it con-
fronted the increased willingness both of the lower courts and of itself
in prior cases to apply a substantive due process scrutiny to govern-
mental attempts to interfere with "autonomous control over the devel-
opment and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and person-
ality."126
The Chief Justice strongly opposed in Paris Theatre any return
to a concept of substantive due process in which legislative ends
as well as means would be judicially examined to insure that they
were "appropriate and legitimate." 127 By insisting that the Court not
use the fourteenth amendment to restrain state legislatures in ways not
compelled by express prohibitions of the Constitution, 128 the Chief Jus-
tice advanced a position apparently inconsistent with the Court's
abortion law decision earlier in the same Term-a decision in which
he had concurred. That decision, Roe v. Wade,' 29 was but one ex-
ample of recent opinions shielding the individual from governmental
intrusions upon his "right to privacy."
sexual conduct such as ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simu-
lated, or which depict acts of masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of
the genitals and sexual relations between humans and animals are "obscene" if,
taken as a whole, the subject matter does not have a serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical or scientific value.
J-R Distributors, 82 Wn.2d at 601-02, 512 P'2d at 1061. But see Papp v. State, 281
So.2d 600 (Fla. App. 1973) (adopting the Miller construction of "obscene material,"
but applying it only prospectively); Stroud v. State, 300 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. App. 1973)
(Indiana obscenity statute held unconstitutional under Miller as not specifying the
descriptions of conduct prohibited); cf. United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 380 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (retroactive application of Miller requirements of obscenity to pre-Miller
indictments would be tantamount to use of ex post facto law).
126. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
127. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
128. 93 S. Ct. at 2637 n. 11. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (opinion of the Court): id. at 167 (Stewart.
J., 6on~urring).
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"Right to privacy" is perhaps a misleading rubric. Privacy is best
conceptualized not as a right to be balanced against other legitimate
governmental interests; rather, it represents a zone of autonomy into
which the government has been granted no power to intrude.130 No
one, of course, has the absolute right to manage his life as he sees fit;
every act of government limits a person's autonomy to some degree.' 31
Clearly, however, the Court has shown special solicitude in preserving
individual autonomy in certain limited spheres of life.' 32
To deny government the power to act because its acting would in-
vade individual privacy is equivalent to asserting that the government
is seeking an impermissible goal, an unreasonable objective; in so
doing the Court applies substantive due process. 33 The Court's tradi-
tional formulation of substantive due process provides protection to an
individual's autonomy in certain unusually sensitive areas, nurturing
those liberties "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked fundamental."' 34 To intrude on these special areas, the
government must demonstrate a compelling interest, and its regula-
tions must be narrowly drawn to achieve only that compelling interest. 1 35
A less mechanical approach might assert that when governmental reg-
ulations begin to encroach upon spheres of life intimately related to a
person's individuality,t 36 the courts will examine with increasing sharp-
ness the ends the government is pursuing and the means it is using.
130. Hufstedler, Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy,
26 RECORD 546, 549-50 (1971).
131. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967).
132. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
133. Because the Roe Court was so diffident in explaining precisely what interest of
the expectant woman was being accorded constitutional protection ("The right to pri-
vacy.., is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153), Professor Ely has criticized the decision as a re-
turn to the substantive due process of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). (In-
deed, this isJustice Stewart's candid basis for concurring in Roe. 410 U.S. at 167-71).
[P] recisely the point of the Lochner philosophy [is to] grant unusual protection to
those 'rights' that somehow seem most pressing, regardless of whether the Constitu-
tion suggests any special solicitude for them.
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
939 (1973).
134. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
136. Harold Laski ... noted that the essence of liberty 'implies power to expand
the choice of the individual of his own way of life without imposed prohibitions
from without.' Men are free, he reasoned, when the rules under which they live
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The more intimate the effect on the individual, the more compelling
the governmental interest required and the more narrowly drawn must
be the regulation. 137
Proscription of certain forms of communication seems subject to
the same objections as regulations on hair length, use of contracep-
tives, sexual acts within marriage and membership in nudist colonies: ' 38
such regulation strikes too closely at an activity intimately related
to an individual's personal life, his personal thoughts and fantasies,
without articulating an overriding governmental interest to justify the
intrusion. Stanley v. Georgia seemed based precisely on this rationale.
One perceptive commentator observed that even though obscenity is un-
protected by the first amendment, "because of its close relationship with
freedom of expression and thought, its regulation becomes increas-
ingly suspect as the regulation begins to encroach on those values."'13 9
Even the later Supreme Court holdings permitting the government
to regulate the sale of obscene material by mail140 and its importation
through customs for commercial purposes 141 could be explained as
leave them without a sense of frustration in realms they deem significant.
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values
of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429,442 (1971).
137. Many lower courts have stricken down "unreasonable" restraints on activities
intimately connected to a person's individual personality. For a ringing refusal to
permit the state to regulate hair length, see Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 706 (W.D.
Wis. 1969), aff'd. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970):
For the state to impair this freedom, in the absence of a compelling subordinating
interest in doing so, would offend a widely shared concept of human dignity, would
assault personality and individuality, would undermine identity, and would invade
human "being." It would violate a basic value "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,".... It would deprive a man or a woman of liberty without due process of
law ....
See also Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) (State may not prohibit sodomy between married persons.
"Absent some demonstrable necessity, matters of (good or bad) taste are to be protected
from regulation."); Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835, 848-50 (E.D. Tenn. 1966)
(striking down a statute making nudism a criminal offense; Darr, J., concurred on sub-
stantive due process grounds); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) ("Travel...
may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or
reads. [I)t is basic to our scheme of values." (Emphasis added)). "One index of the unac-
ceptability of the state's intrusion into the private lives of its citizens may be the degree
to which it reaches the minutiae of those lives." Note, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702, 1710
(1971). Would the Court uphold a law prohibiting as immoral the wearing of lipstick?
Or forcing women to wear a veil? See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine,
64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 226 (1965).
138. See note 137 supra.
139. Comment, Karalexis v. Byrne and the Regulation of Obscenity: "IAm Cu-
rious (Stanley)" 56 VA.L.REV. 1205, 1215 (1970).
140. United States v, Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
141. United States v.Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
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permitting prohibition of activities fairly remote from personal use
and possession. But the decisions of last Term emphatically concluded
that Stanley protects a place-the home-not a zone of autonomy
about the personal activity of reading; 142 the Court's extensive treat-
ment of this issue in Paris Theatre, Orito and 12 Reels appears to
have nailed the lid solidly in place on the argument that the act of
reading is in itself within a zone of autonomy.143
V. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES IN REGULATING
OBSCENITY
Even if the first amendment does not protect obscene material, and
even if regulation of obscenity invades no personal zone of privacy,
the state still must demonstrate some permissible purpose which it
hopes to achieve by its legislation-individual liberties may not be
curtailed at whim or to advance forbidden goals. The classic due
process test for judging the validity of an exercise of the police power
was stated by the Court in Lawton v. Steele:144
To justify the state in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear-First, that the interests of the public . . .
require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose ....
Although the Court had never explicated the permissible goals which
it believed legislatures might further in enacting obscenity laws,' 45
commentators had suggested possible objectives and had attempted
to evaluate their validity. Professor Emerson suggested five major cat-
142. "The Constitution does not compel ... an exception for private use of obscene
material." 12 Reels, 93 S. Ct. at 2669. But cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 34, 351
(1967): "the Fourth Amendment [in restricting searches and seizures] protects people.
not places."
143. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
144. 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) quoted as still valid in Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962). See Boiling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390.
399-400 (1923).
145. Professor Kalven's half-serious suggestion that obscenity legislation is moti-
vated primarily by fear of inciting masturbation may contain a kernal of psychological
truth, but it is not a conscious legislative objective which the Solicitor General would
care to argue to the Supreme Court. See Kalven, supra, 1960 Sup. CT. Rav. at 4 n.2 I.
118
Vol. 49: 89, 1973
Obscenity
egories into which most proposed justifications of obscenity regulation
fall:146
(1) that the expression has an adverse moral impact, apart from any
effect upon overt behavior;
(2) that the expression may stimulate or induce subsequent conduct in
violation of law; 147
(3) that the expression may produce adverse effects on personality and
attitudes which in the long run lead to illegal behavior; 48
(4) that the expression has a shock effect, of an emotionally disturbing
nature [in more attenuated form, this effect is expressed as a blight on
community aesthetics, merging into the common law category of
nuisance' 49 ] ; and
(5) that the expression has especially adverse effects, of the sort de-
scribed in the previous categories, upon children, who are intelle-
tually and emotionally immature.
Emerson dismissed the first three categories as "incompatible with the
basic theory of freedom of expression as incorporated in the first
amendment."' 5 0 Dicta in Stanley v. Georgia in effect suggested that
only the fourth and fifth, protection of nonconsenting adults and juve-
niles, were permissible state goals in regulating obscenity. 151 The
Chief Justice rejected this reading of Stanley. Even apart from a pos-
sible correlation between obscene material and criminal acts, the
Court held in Paris Theatre that the state has a right to maintain "a
decent society."
The phrase sounds attractive and contemporary: a decent society,
"or to use terms that have perhaps greater currency, the style and
quality of life, now and in the future."'152 The Chief Justice wove sup-
pression of obscenity into a larger pattern of accepted societal goals:
prohibition of unfair business practices, protection of the environment
146. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ.
877, 937 (1963).
147. But see THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
256-87 (1970).
148. See id. at233-56.
149. Shapiro, Obscenity Law: A Public Policy Analysis, 20 J. PUB. L. 503, 509
(1971).
150. Emerson, note 133 supra, at 938.
151. 394 U.S. at 567.
152. Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2636, quoting Bickel, Dissenting & Concurring
Opinions [part of symposium on obscenity] 22 THE PUB. INTEREST 25 (1971).
119
Washington Law Review
from pollution, preservation of forests and streams.15 3 All legislative
efforts at improving our surroundings, he observed, result in the lim-
iting of some individual freedoms for the sake of the general welfare;
all are based on "unprovable assumptions about what is good for the
people, including imponderable aesthetic assumptions .... 154
The Chief Justice here created a little pollution himself, of the
smokescreen variety. In terms of Professor Emerson's categories, a
"decent society" is a number one or a number three justification
posing as a number four. Assuming that obscenity is unprotected
speech, it certainly may be regulated to avoid environmental offen-
siveness in the same way that advertising signs or public nuisances are
regulated. 55 But the Chief Justice clearly intended to stamp an impri-
matur on laws which went far beyond controlling nuisances. The
analogy to social and environmental legislation was a cosmetic cover
for statutes whose real purpose was to control the influences acting on
the minds of citizens. The "decent society" sanctioned by the Chief
Justice entails more than cleaning up 42nd Street or Times Square; he
envisions a society where men and women act cleanly because they
think cleanly.
Debate on the issue of censorship causes hard feelings and misun-
derstandings between persons of equally good will. Much of their frus-
tration derives from the fact that they are arguing from opposing sets
of premises about the nature of man and his place in society. "Liber-
al" and "conservative" have acquired misleading connotations; "polit-
ical optimist" and "political pessimist" better describe the real conflict.
John Stuart Mill and Alexander Meiklejohn exemplify the optimistic
faith that humans are fundamentally "decent" and capable of gov-
erning themselves decently, both individually and collectively in a
democracy. Pessimists like Edmund Burke view life as shadowed by
original sin and humans as naturally weak and corrupt, requiring
limits on conduct imposed externally by authority and tradition, and
153. The environmental analogy is not new to the ChiefJustice's thoughts. See Rabe
v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 317 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
154. Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2638.
155. The state's power to regulate public displays of offensive protected speech is
much less comprehensive. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 93 S. Ct. 1197 (1973);
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971). But cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949). These cases are discussed in Note, 48 WASH. L. REV. 667 (1973).
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internally by a conscience trained in childhood. Optimists have
strongly supported freedom of expression not only for its importance
to self-government in a democracy, but for the self-fulfillment it af-
fords the individual and the greater richness of experience it provides
by encouraging development of a pluralistic society. 15 6 Pessimists, on
the other hand, look to government not for richness of experience or
encouragement of individuality, but for development of virtue in man
and in society.157 Both views are philosophically respectable, but the
American Constitution was the product of an optimistic era which be-
lieved in man's ability to govern himself. Political pessimists under-
standably have difficulty in meshing their vision of society with the
structure and spirit of the Constitution.
Plato was a "pessimist" who in a time of decline sought after a de-
cent society. Since poetry appealed to base emotions, clouding man's
rational faculties, he was quite content to ban poets from his utopia.1 58
Although the Chief Justice's views have been tempered by American
history and experience, still his approach to relations between man
and state seem closer to Plato's than to Mill's. He shares with Plato a
fear of man's imperfections, the anarchy certain to emerge should the
state loosen its reins on the erratic individual. Like Plato, he views the
state as an educational institution;15 9 the unspoken corollary is that its
citizens are immature and under governmental tutelage.160 Plato was
156. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of he First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ.
877, 879-81 (1963); DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth:
Toward an Ideological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 161, 201 (1972). "In short, individuality, diversity, and maximum self-develop-
ment in all spheres are what make the human race worth belonging to .... Burnett,
Corruption of Morals-The Underlying Issue of the Pornography Commission Report,
1971 L. &SocIAL ORDER 189, 199 (1971).
157. DUVAL, supra, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 202-03. See also H. CLOR, OBSCENITY
AND PUBLIC MORALITY 242 (1969):
[C] ivilized society cannot afford to be neutral toward a perception of life which
undermines its efforts to make of man something more than a creature of ele-
mental passions and sensations.
158. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC. See also G. MARCEL, MAN AGAINST MASS SOCIETY 20
(1962): "Man depends, to a very large degree, on the idea he has of himself, and...
this idea cannot be degraded without at the same time degrading man."
159. If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete education requires
certain books, ...can we then say that a state legislature may not act on the
corollary assumption that commerce in obscene books [has] a tendency to exert
a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior?
Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2638.
160. Compare the post-election statement by President Nixon:
The average American is just like the child in the family. You give him some re-
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an unabashed aristocrat who provided his imaginary citizenry with a
class of philosopher-kings as guardians; the Chief Justice does not
explain who in a self-governing republic will act in loco parentis for a
citizenry so susceptible to corrupting and debasing literature. 16'
In this respect, therefore, the Chief Justice's opinion is inconsistent
with the fundamental theorem of the Constitution: The citizen gov-
erns himself. After reasonable debate, the majority may decide to con-
trol pollution, require garbage disposal or regulate securities offers.
Minorities may be hurt by these measures, but they lose only in the
pocketbook or in their freedom to act-they retain the basic freedom
to persist in their dissenting views and proselytize new support from
the majority. But if the majority can enact measures which deprive the
minority not only of their freedom to act, but also of their ability to
reinforce their own beliefs and strive for converts, then they have de-
sponsibility and he is going to amount to something. He is going to do some-
thing. If, on the other hand, you make him completely dependent and pamper
him and cater to him too much, you are going to make him soft, spoiled, and
eventually a very weak individual.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1972, at 20, col. 8.
In Paris Theatre, the Chief Justice quotes freely from Irving Kristol. His choice of
authors is significant. Kristol has written:
The purpose of democracy cannot possibly be the endless functioning of its own
political machinery. The purpose of any political regime is to achieve some ver-
sion of the good life and the good society ....
S. * [B] ecause the desirability of self-government depends on the character
of the people who govern, the older idea of democracy was very solicitous of the
condition of this character. It was solicitous of the individual self, and felt an
obligation to educate it into what used to be called "republican virtue." And it
was solicitous of that collective self which we call public opinion and which, in
a democracy, governs us collectively ....
• ... And because it cared, this older idea of democracy had no problem in
principle with pornography and/or obscenity. It censored them-and it did so
with a perfect clarity of mind and a perfectly clear conscience. It was not about
to permit people capriciously to corrupt themselves. ...
[Ihf you care for the quality of life in our American democracy. then
you have to be for censorship.
I. KRISTOL, ON THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 41-43 (1972).
The idea that 'everything is permitted,' as Nietzsche put it, rests on the premise
of nihilism. . . . In short, the matter of pornography and obscenity is not a
trivial one. ...
* * * I suggest that it is inherently and purposefully subversive of civilization
and its institutions.
Id. at 39-40.
161. In fairness to the Chief Justice and the majority for whom he wrote, in ap-
plying a rational basis test analysis he simply expressed what the legislature might
reasonably have believed in passing obscenity legislation. He pursued the discussion
with such eloquence and at such length, however, as to leave no doubt of his personal
beliefs.
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prived them of a liberty fundamental to a democracy without due
process of law.
VI. BUILDING A FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY:
THE MEIKLEJOHN MODEL
Last Term's opinions are regressive in their approach to obscenity.
The Court's emphasis on a metaphysical definition of obscenity, its
rejection of fresh approaches like those suggested by Justice Brennan
and the Stanley opinion and its rather narrow understanding of "serious
value" in a sexual context162 -these features of the opinion and others
all display less concern with protecting individual liberties from very
real potential infringements than with sanctioning some vague interest
of the state in collective self-purification. On the other hand, by
ensuring protection for any work possessing "serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value" the Miller Court brings obscenity law
more explicitly into conformity with the Meiklejohn model of the first
amendment, which perhaps bodes well for the future. 63
It was Dr. Meiklejohn's thesis, a thesis increasingly discussed and
accepted by commentators, that the first amendment protects not pri-
vate rights to speak, but the right of the citizenry to self-government.
Because we as a people have chosen to govern ourselves, he argued,
we have reserved the freedom of thought, association and communica-
tion necessary to govern successfully. 6 4 But Meiklejohn did not be-
162. See text accompanying note 206 infra.
163. Notwithstanding this analysis, Chief Justice Burger did not, of course, in-
dorse explicitly the views of Meiklejohn any more than did Justice Brennan in New
York Times. The Chief Justice was, however, well aware of his theory. He demon-
strated his familiarity with Meiklejohn's writings by quoting them with approval in
another first amendment case decided the same day as the obscenity cases. Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553, 2565 n.
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 45-46 (1948). The Chief Justice's opinions, in requiring pro-
tection of certain specified forms of "serious value" and application of due process
standards to unprotected speech, and in seeking to insure that citizens are free to
receive all ideas necessary to govern themselves, point to a parallel course between
the majority of the Court and Meiklejohn.
164. The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak." It protects
the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we "gov-
ern." It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a govern-
mental responsibility.
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255. See
generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)
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lieve that the first amendment was "the guardian of unregulated talka-
tiveness." 165 The freedom of speech which it shelters is not the
freedom of a citizen as an individual to speak his mind, but the
freedom of a citizen as a voter to hear every idea relevant to issues on
which he must pass judgment. Meiklejohn used the familiar metaphor
of the nation as town meeting. The very purpose of the meeting is to
hear all ideas on the issue being discussed. Yet this purpose cannot be
achieved unless each person's freedom to choose the time, place and
subject of his speech is to some degree abridged. An individual's right
to speak in a given instance is a fifth amendment liberty, subject to
abridgement by due process of law like other personal liberties, but
the right of the people to hear every idea needed to make choices ne-
cessary for self-government is an absolute, non-abridgeable right
under the first amendment. 166 Professor Kalven, an admirer of Meik-
lejohn's ideas, questioned whether his model of the first amendment
was not too limited in scope, being restricted to protection of political
ideas: 167
Not all communications are relevant to the political process. The
people do not need novels or dramas or paintings or poems because
they will be called upon to vote. Art and belles-lettres do not deal in
such ideas-at least not good art or belles-lettres ....
This criticism suggested a rather narrow conception of the sort of idea
relevant to the political process. Meiklejohn responded to Kalven by
observing that many forms of thought and expression provide the
"knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for
sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should
express."1,8 These forms include education, the findings of philosophy
republished as Part I of A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) [hereinafter
cited as POLITICAL FREEDOM].
165. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960).
166. Indeed, under the very rationale of the Constitution as a whole. See, e.g.,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra, 34-36.
[U] nder the Bill of Rights, there are two freedoms, or liberties, of speech, rather
than only one. There is a "freedom of speech" which the First Amendment de-
clares to be non-abridgeable. But there is also a "liberty of speech" which the
Fifth Amendment declares to be abridgeable.
Id. at 36.
Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965): "Free expression [is] of
transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights .
167. Kalven, supra, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. at 16.
168. Meiklejohn, supra, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. at 256.
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and the sciences, literature and the arts and public political discus-
sion.169 The fine arts, he observed, help shape the values by which
voters make decisions.
Dr. Meiklejohn's ideas apparently enjoyed a major triumph in
1964. In reversing on first amendment grounds an award for libel of a
public figure, Justice Brennan wrote in New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan170 that the great accomplishment of the first amendment had
been to eliminate the crime of seditious libel.171 The Court strongly
affirmed the right and duty of a citizen to criticize elected officials as
part of his constitutional duty of self-government: 172
It is as much [the citizen-critic's] duty to criticize as it is the official's
duty to administer .... As Madison said, "the censorial power is in
the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the
people."
Justice Brennan reacted favorably to suggestions that New York
Times incorporated Meiklejohn's thesis that the first amendment pre-
serves the citizen's role as ruler,173 but warned in a law review article
that "[r] adical shifts in judicial doctrine are rare. They usually occur
over long periods, step-by-step in a series of decisions."' 1 4 While Jus-
tice Brennan's warning cannot be disregarded, it seems clear that since
New York Times the stature of Meiklejohn's political theory of the
first amendment has increased markedly; it is now the principal touch-
stone by which the contours of freedom of expression are described. 175
169. Id. at 257.
170. 376 U.S. 254(1964).
171. Id. at 273. Accord, Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 512 P.2d 702,
706 (Mont. 1973): "Historically, the free press amendment is construed to mean
freedom from three major types of restraint: censorship, licensing, and seditious
libel, which is defamation of the government."
172. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 282.
173. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 209.
It is not easy to predict what the Court will see in the Times opinion as the
years roll by. . . .But the invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public
official to government policy to matters in the public domain, like art, seems
to me to be overwhelming. If the Court accepts the invitation, it will slowly
work out for itself the theory of free speech that Alexander Meiklejohn has
been offering us for some fifteen years now.
Id. at 221.
174. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1965).
175. Most of the present justices of the Supreme Court have acknowledged their
support of the fundamentals of Meiklejohn's theory at one time or another. See, e.g.,
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By requiring an absence of "serious literary, artistic, political, and
scientific value," the Court apparently attempted to justify suppression
of obscenity in terms it believed consistent with Meiklejohn's assertion
that the first amendment protects only that expression which contrib-
utes to the ability of citizens to govern themselves. In so doing, it has
incorporated obscenity law into a general theory of the first amend-
ment while retaining the two-level terminology used in Roth.
To congratulate the Court for this incorporation probably would
be to praise necessity as though it were virtue. After the Court's dis-
cussion of libel in New York Times, continued reliance on a strict
Roth analysis may have been an untenable position for the Court to
assume, despite Miller's emphasizing that the "social redeeming value"
test of Memoirs had been a drastic change of the Roth definition. The
Roth Court had been able to avoid Justice Douglas's attempt to apply
first amendment tests to obscenity by holding that for historical reasons
obscenity was outside the purview of the first amendment.1 76 The
Supreme Court undermined this approach in New York Times when
it refused to accept a jury's finding that a political advertisement was
libel as affording a "talismanic immunity from constitutional limita-
tions. 1 77 The Court insisted on looking behind the label of "libel" to
ascertain whether dissemination of the material in question furthered
the goals which the first amendment was designed to promote; after
New York Times, it seemed clear that the Court would have to look
behind the label in obscenity cases as well.1 78 No longer, presumably,
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm.. 93 S. Ct. 2080.
2086 (1973) (per Burger, C.J.); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,762-65 (1972) (per
Blackmun. J.): Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665. 726 nn.l & 3 (1972) (Stewart. J..
dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (per Brennan. J..
joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.)" id. at 60 (White, J., concurring): id. at 79
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367. 390 (1969)
(per White, J.); United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas. J.,
dissenting).
176. Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so
closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it .... As a peo-
ple, we cannot afford to relax that standard.
354 U.S. at 514 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444.
450, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
177. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
[W] e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the
epithet 'libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law.... It must be mea-
sured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
178. Professor Kalven felt that New York Times tolled the knell of the two-level
theory. Kalven, supra, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. at 217-18.
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could a jury's determination that material was pruriently arousing and
patently offensive suffice to remove it from constitutional scrutiny.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Memoirs came two years after New
York Times. His incorporation of the redeeming social value require-
ment saved the test from the "labelling" objection; under Memoirs, a
court would be required to make a specific finding in each case that the
material totally lacked any value entitled to first amendment protection.
The Miller Court may have been willing to discard the Memoirs plu-
rality holding, but still found itself confronted by the logic of New
York Times which forced it to enunciate some test allowing supression
of obscenity only within a first amendment context. The Meiklejohn
theory, besides enjoying increased acceptance, was useful in that its
interpretation of the first amendment as protecting the people's ability
to govern themselves seemed to permit a less all-encompassing shelter-
ing of speech than had the Memoirs "utterly without redeeming social
value" requirement. The Court was able to exclude all material from
first amendment protection which did not serve this purpose and did
so by phrasing its "serious value" requirement in terms very reminiscent
of those used by Meiklejohn himself.179
While most members of the Court now support the Meiklejohn
"self-government" theory of the first amendment, 80 the Miller ma-
jority used it in a spirit far removed from that in which it was con-
ceived. Meiklejohn was an earnest ,advocate of free speech who
launched a strong attack against use of Justice Holmes's "clear and
present danger" test as a weapon to punish political dissent.181 Miller,
on the other hand, may have used his theory to restrict rather than
enlarge freedom of speech by deducing that since the first amendment
protects all expression which contributes to citizen self-government,
pornographic writings (which by judicial definition have no serious
value) are excluded from its purview. Meiklejohn theorized that some
forms of writing and speaking are beyond the scope of the first
amendment, 182 but his rationale of the first amendment distinguished
179. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
180. See note 175 supra.
181. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 29-50. See Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (195 1), for such a use of the clear and present danger test. It was Meiklejohn's
thought viewed in this context which enabled Justice Douglas, who favors an absolute
construction of the first amendment, to declare: "My view is close to that of the late
Alexander Meiklejohn ... " Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 713.
182. See POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 21; but see Meiklejohn, supra, 1961
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less between kinds of expression than between private and public in-
terests in speech. 83
The drawback to the Meiklejohn theory of the first amendment-to
the Court, its attractiveness-is that while it provides a rational
framework behind which citizens could rally, it needs to be given con-
tent by judicial decision. What speech, exactly, is useful to a voter?
Meiklejohn himself did not include art and literature until Professor
Kalven observed that his theory seemed to leave them unprotected. 8 4
The Miller Court gladly afforded first amendment protection to art
and literature, but held that the requirement of serious value excluded
protection for hardcore pornography.
VII. HARDCORE PORNOGRAPHY-
CONSTITUTIONALLY OBSCENE?
Miller's assertion that categories of speech not essential to a demo-
cratic peoples' self-government and devoid of ideational content
should be unprotected by the first amendment is comprehensible as
theory. However, the Court's application of this theory to hardcore
pornography poses problems. 85
The first difficulty is Miller's ambiguity in describing the relation-
ship between ideational content and serious value. Roth itself stated
that "[a] 11 ideas having even the slightest redeeming social import-
ance"1 86 were protected, but that obscenity was not protected, being
utterly lacking in such importance-and thus impliedly empty of
SuP. CT. REV. at 262-63. He definitely excluded private libel from first amendment
protection. Id. at 258-59. Accord, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)
(per Brennan, J.) ("Calculated falsehood" falls outside first amendment protection).
183. The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all
speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon is-
sues which voters have to deal-only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of
public interest. Private speech, or private interest in speech, on the other hand, has
no claim whatever to the protection of the First Amendment.
POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 79.
A citizen may be told when and where and in what manner he may or may not
speak, write, assemble, and so on. On the other hand, he may not be told what he
shall or shall not believe. In that realm each citizen is sovereign.
Meiklejohn, supra, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. at 257.
184. Meiklejohn, supra, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. at 262-63.
185. The ChiefJustice adopted Justice Stewart's former belief that obscenity regula-
tion was limited to "hard core" pornography. Justice Stewart's ideas have since evolved.
and he joined Justice Brennan in dissent.
186. 354U.S. at 484.
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ideas. Kingsley Pictures, in rejecting "thematic obscenity," empha-
sized that the first amendment protected all ideas, whatever their
merits.' 87 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Jacobellis synthesized
Roth and Kingsley Pictures, stating in the disjunctive that "material
dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas . . . or that has lit-
erary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social import-
ance" was protected.18 8 The tripartite Miller test demands only a
showing that the material possesses no serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical or scientific value. The Court's discussion of that requirement,
however, repeatedly emphasized that regulation of obscenity entails no
"censorship of ideas-good or bad, sound or unsound;" the Chief Jus-
tice insisted that only verbal or pictoral depictions of conduct can be
punished as obscene. 189 The Court thus seemed to hold that any idea,
however unmeritorious or unsound, possesses ipso facto the required
serious value. If material charged as obscene can be shown to have
ideational content it may not be suppressed, however otherwise
lacking in serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Another difficulty is that the Miller Court, like other courts in the
past, 190 presumed that hardcore pornography conveys no ideas. But
in each case, the prosecution must prove this fact, not rely on a pre-
sumption.' 9 ' The Court has admonished in the past that the line be-
tween ideas and non-ideational expression is fine and elusive: "What is
one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."' 9 2 If it follows
past precedent, the Court will resolve any doubt whether a form
187. "[T] he First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas.
• . . It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no
less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax." Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of Univ. of State of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959). If material
expresses any idea, determining its merits is the province of history, not of a criminal jury.
188. 378 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added). Compare Attorney General v. Book
Named 'Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 184 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1962): "We think...
that the First Amendment protects material which has value because of ideas, news,
or artistic, literary, or scientific attributes."
189. The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value, regardless of whether the government
or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent. "The protec-
tion given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas .. " [citing Roth].
Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2620 (emphasis added in Miller).
190. See, e.g., Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 52 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr.
800, 813 (1963); Attorney General v. Book Named 'Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11,
184 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1962).
191. SeeNew YorkTimes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
192. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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of expression conveys ideas in favor of protecting first amendment
values. 193 The Miller Court, in applying a Meiklejohn-like analysis of
the first amendment to obscenity, itself recognized that literary and
artistic endeavors convey ideas; 194 it referred to the "expression of se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific ideas. 195
Learning of a form of communication which conveys no ideas is like
discovering a Cheshire smile without the cat: the one generally accom-
panies the other. The Court perhaps considered pornography to be a
uniquely non-ideational form of expressive conduct, tending to operate
directly upon the sexual organs with minimal intervening circuitry
through the brain.' 96 And yet, literature of other genres may arouse
sensations of hunger, anger, fear or horror without losing its first
amendment protection. Ideas are often triggered by the immediate
emotional reaction one experiences upon reading a book or seeing a
photograph; a vivid description of My Lai, or a photograph of a
napalmed Vietnamese child running naked down a road, may produce
an immediate sensation of horror, succeeded by a new understanding
of the effects of war upon victor and victim alike, without any need of
the writer's having prompted these thoughts directly. Similarly, to read
the sexually taboo may cause the reader to question the wisdom of
the taboo. 97
193. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures
are "a significant medium for the communication of ideas," id. at 501); In re Giannini.
69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 910 (1969)
(topless dancing is a form of expression protected by the first amendment).
194. Contra, Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. LJ. 1 (1971).
195. 93 S. Ct. at 2621 (emphasis added).
196. In esthetic theory, art is distinguished by a certain detachment between ob-
served and observer, enabling the observer to contemplate not merely the message of
the art but the manner in which the message is conveyed. Pornography, like propaganda,
deliberately endeavors to destroy that detachment. See generally Finnis, "Reason and
Passion:" The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 222 (1967).
197. "[T]o write pornography is to express an idea that pornography should be
produced." Katz, Free Discussion v. Final Decision: Moral and Artistic Controversy
and the Tropic of Cancer Trials, 79 YALE L.J. 209, 213 (1969). Likewise, of course, to
kill may assert the idea that the act of killing can have value. See A. CAMus, THE
STRANGER (1946). In either case, elements of"conduct" are combined with the expression
of ideas. See Note, 48 WASH. L. REV. 667, 674-76 (1973). A compelling state interest in
preventing the conduct is required to justify impeding the expression of ideas. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Preventing death would certainly be a compel-
ling interest, but preventing a "degradation" in public attitudes seems to strike too
closely at the very interests which the first amendment was designed to protect. See
Note, supra, 48 WASH. L. REV. at 676; cf. Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2662 (Brennan, J..
dissenting).
130
Obscenity
Indeed, the extensive discussion which the majority in Paris The-
atre devoted to preservation of a decent society belies its assertion that
obscenity conveys no ideas. The Chief Justice was not concerned
merely with an environment polluted by tawdry books; he was
alarmed by the prospect of a society peopled with morally insensitive
degenerates. Magazines such as Playboy may have done much to in-
crease the respectability of hedonism in the United States; it advanced
this idea at least as much by its photography and its risque humor as
by the "Playboy Philosophy;" certainly the Court would concede that
the Sierra Club has advanced the idea of wilderness preservation by its
photography, and it would be hard-pressed to distinguish the two ana-
lytically without judging the merits of hedonism vis-h-vis wilderness
preservation. As one commentator observes:198
[T] he claim that pornography presents the debasement and dehumani-
zation of man and that it involves no ideas is a contradiction. Surely
the debasement of man is a serious moral idea . . . . To the extent
that pornography makes a claim-by showing, not telling-that re-
ducing human beings into objects for manipulation is good or fun, it is
within the realm of ideas.
Under our form of government, advocacy of socially undesirable ideas
should be combatted by counter-advocacy, not by suppression.
In Paris Theatre, the Court discussed at some length the ways in
which government restricts speech and association in a commercial
context. The Miller Court's soundest constitutional argument for
deeming obscenity to possess a non-ideational character might have
been that commercial speech also affects one's thoughts and aspira-
tions, indeed may affect one's life more than noncommercial speech,
and yet it is not protected by the first amendment. Chief Justice
Burger remarked:' 99
Understandably those who entertain an absolutist view of the First
Amendment find it uncomfortable to explain why rights of association,
speech, and press should be severely restrained in the marketplace of
goods and money, but not in the marketplace of pornography.
A better solution to the inconsistency might be to extend first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech, not strip it from pornography.
198. Katz, supra, 79 YALE LJ. at 216.
199. Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2637-38.
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For thirty years, since Valentine v. Chrestensen,20 0 it has been clear
that purely commercial advertising is not protected speech. Chres-
tensen merely stated that the state may decide "[w] hether and to what
extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the
streets .... ."201 It is clear that an advertisement which expresses an
opinion on public issues is protected speech.20 2 The distinguishing
factor between such an advertisement and one for a commercial
product is the communication of ideas beyond the simple selling of
one advertiser's product. Today's subtle advertising conveys many
ideas with profound effect on public values, 20 3 and the Chrestensen
rule probably should be abandoned. This abandonment, suggested by
the Chief Justice himself,2 0 4 would remove an important support for
his position.
VIII. PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE
The Court has established the constitutional contours of obscenity
doctrine and tossed the ball back to the state and lower federal courts.
How these courts apply the new guidelines will determine the content
of obscenity law, at least in the immediate future. 205 Although these
courts may feel a psychological impetus to loosen the reins on state
obscenity prosecutions, a careful analysis and application of the
Miller test should produce little change in obscenity determinations.
Indeed, in light of the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to follow
Meiklejohn's political model of the first amendment with its emphasis
on self-government and protection of all ideas, lower courts might
eventually conclude that "obscenity" is an empty category because
200. 316 U.S. 52(1942).
201. Id. at 54.
202. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
203. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (cigarette
ads strongly imply smoking is a desirable habit).
204. In an interesting coincidence, in a case decided the same day as the obscenity
cases, the Chief Justice questioned the continued validity of Chrestensen. Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553, 2562 (Burger, C.
J., dissenting). See Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971).
205. One's ability to remain sanguine regarding the common sense of state courts is
lessened upon hearing of the recent decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. Immediately
following last Term's obscenity decisions, the Georgia court upheld by a four to three
decision a lower court's finding that Carnal Knowledge was obscene. The exhibitor of
the film, which was a major studio production, was convicted on criminal charges.
Jenkins v. State, 199 S.E.2d 183 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W.
3200 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
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all expression contains ideas and is valuable in developing the people's
ability to govern themselves.
Acceptance of a political model could bode well for the future of
political expression in the United States. Yet, a motif of uncontestably
Puritan grimness runs through the five majority opinions. That the
one example offered by the Chief Justice of sexual material possessing
literary, artistic, political or scientific value should be an illustrated
medical text has its ominous aspects. 206 So does the rather vindictive
manner in which, after equating sexual "permissiveness" with laissez-
faire economics, he throws the liberals' traditional arguments back
in their faces. But motifs do not set precedents, and not all five mem-
bers of the majority would have written the same opinion. Regardless
of the Chief Justice's approach to literature and art, it is quite likely
that a healthy majority of the Court will continue to find serious value
in works considerably more entertaining than Gray's Anatomy.
Lower courts must look at the test upon which the Miller majority
agreed, not at the distaste for sexual low-life which the opinion con-
veys. Certainly, modification of the Memoirs test should cause no
great upsurge in obscenity convictions. Whether material is described
as lacking serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value or as
utterly without redeeming social value probably will mean little to a
jury; under either formula it is being asked essentially to decide that
the nation does not need a book or film. This is an awesome determi-
nation for a jury to make and hardly one for which it is well suited.
While "prurient interest" and "patent offensiveness" may be largely
questions of fact on which the findings of the jury can be final,2 07 a
finding that prurient material does not have sufficient serious value to
warrant first amendment protection must ultimately be a determina-
tion for the Supreme Court.208 Like it or not, eventually the Court
will be forced to give further guidance in the application of its test,
once more acting as "Super Censor. '2 09
206. See Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2616.
207. Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2618.
208. [T] he First Amendment values ... are adequately protected by the ulti-
mate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional
claims when necessary.
Miller, 93 S. Ct. at 2615. See Paris Theatre, 93 S. Ct. at 2656 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
209. The epithet is Chief Justice Warren's. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203
(1964) (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Yes, I know that the law today is what today the Court says it is. But
you see I am hoping that tomorrow the members of the Court will
read again from Madison and Hamilton and Harlan. Perhaps to-
morrow they will change their minds.
-Alexander Meiklejohn210
Bertrand Russell noted that the academic thinker easily becomes so
infatuated with manipulating verbal symbols that he loses sight of
their real world referents. 21 1 In law, where abstract principles are al-
ways subordinate to social and political realities, such scholarly de-
tachment can lead quickly to the assertion of absurd conclusions. In
speaking loftily of the first amendment, it is easy to overlook some of
the down to earth realities which opponents of obscenity confront.
The hard-core obscenity with which the Court is concerned is not
pretty stuff. Foes of censorship no longer have the privilege of fighting
for the people's right to read Ulysses or Lady Chatterley's Lover or
even Tropic of Cancer; they fight instead for a person's right to read
magazines or view films which they would themselves probably find
offensive.
Nonetheless history demonstrates that " [t] he door barring federal
and state intrusion into [the area of free speech] cannot be left ajar; it
must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack neces-
sary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests..2 12 The
Court last term attempted to leave the door open only that slightest
crack, but the danger in giving any encouragement to proponents of
suppression is always that forces will be unleashed which even the
most carefully constructed constitutional bulwarks will be unable to
contain.
The new test which the Court announced in Miller is a variant of
the Memoirs test, imposing standards only slightly easier for prosecu-
210. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164. at 106.
211. It is true that education tries to depersonalize language, and with a certain
measure of success .... [A]s your instruction proceeds, the world of words be-
comes more and more separated from the world of the senses; you acquire the art
of using words correctly, as you might acquire the art of playing the fiddle; in the
end you become such a virtuoso in the manipulation of phrases that you need
hardly ever remember that words have meanings.
B. RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 4-5 (1948).
212. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
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tors to fulfill. The threat represented by last Term's opinions lies less
in their formal holdings than in their dominant mood. Clearly the
Court had no intention of rethinking its constitutional approach to
obscenity. It reaffirmed Roth's conclusion that obscenity was a special
class of speech, lacking importance worthy of first amendment protec-
tion; it refused to treat seriously Justice Brennan's fears that the neces-
sary vagueness of obscenity standards would chill protected expres-
sion; it halted abruptly the development of due process protection for
the act of reading and receiving information. For the first time, the
Court discussed the legislative goals which a legislature could pursue
in enacting obscenity statutes, but the goal of a "decent society" which
it posited is so vague and all-encompassing an end as to justify vir-
tually any conceivable legislative program.
The Court appears to have made a strategic decision to permit ob-
scenity prosecutions when possible to do so without violence to past
precedent. In a series of maneuvers, obscenity law was retrenched to a
less expansive but more easily defended position. One of these maneu-
vers was adherence to Meildejohn's model, so interpreted as to pro-
vide a coherent justification for excluding obscenity from the protec-
tions normally accorded speech. The analytical structure furnished by
this model is sound and will survive to a happier time when the Court
is more inclined to protect the right of the individual to choose for
himself what he will read and view. Judicial decisions will then reflect
the fact that all communication transmits ideas, good or bad, and that
a self-governing people has a right to weigh those ideas for itself. The
spirit and logic of the Meiklejohn structure may then persuade the
Court to close the door completely on censorship.
Donald C. Harrison*
* Third-year lawstudent, University ofWashington; A.B., 1962, StanfordUniversity;
M.S., 1969, University of Washington.
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